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NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Santoriello
t
(decided December 30, 1999)
Defendant, Alex Santoriello, sailed an advertising banner over
the Hudson River and was charged with violating Section 10-
126(d)(1) of the New York City Administrative Code2 ("1999
Code"), a misdemeanor. Due to the rare invocation of this
regulation, this was a novel issue for the New York City Criminal
Court.4  Defendant argues that the Federal Aviation
Administration's ("FAA") regulations5 preempt6 the New York
City ordinance, thus rendering the ordinance unconstitutional. The
Criminal Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional on its
face because it entirely prohibited that which is permitted by
federal law.7
Alex Santoriello is an officer and employee of ParaSail NYC,
Ltd. ("ParaSail"), in the business of flying aerial banners from
boats. ParaSail is permitted to tow banners in the navigable
702 N.Y.S2d 539 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999).
2 NEw YORK CITY ADMNIsTRATIvE CODE § 10-126(d)(1) (1985). This statute
provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawfiul for any person to use, suffer or
permit to be used advertising in the form of towing banners from or upon an
aircraft over the limits of the city." Id.
3 NEw YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 10-126(I) (1985) This statute
provides in pertinent part- "Any person who violates any of the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
4 Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
5 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(a)(1) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part:
"The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the
United States." Id.
6 Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 542. "Preemption occurs when state or local law
actually conflicts with federal law, such as where 'compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility' or where state and local law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and
objectives of Congress." Id.
I Id. (noting that "[t]his court sees no escape from the conclusion that however
salutary and well-intentioned the Code may be, it does in fact entirely prohibit,
not regulate, what the Federal government has authorized. Therefore,
Administrative Code § 10-126(d)(1) is unconstitutional on its face.").
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airspace' under the authority of a "Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization" issued by the United States Department of
Transportation, FAA.9 However, Section 10-126(d)(1) of the 1999
Code was in conflict with the Federal Waiver received by the
defendant10 Pn Augus. 5, 199.9, 4efendant corporation towed via
para-sail an advertising banner in the navigable airspace over the
Hudson River." The defendant was issued a summons for
violation of the New York City ordinance.1 2  Santoriello argued
that the city ordinance proscribing the towing of banners over New
York City is preempted by Federal law.1 3
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the Queens
County Magistrates' Court's decision in People v. Coffrin,"4 the
central case supporting the court's decision in the case at bar." In
1953, Coffin was charged with violation of a provision of the then
Administrative Code of New York City ("1953 Code") which was
identical to the 1999 Code provision under which Santoriello was
charged. 16
8 49 U.S.C.A. § 40102(30) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part:
"[N]avigable airspace means airspace above the minimum altitude of flight
prescribed by regulations ... to ensure the safety and landing of aircraft." Id.
9 1d.
10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
n Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
12 id.
13 Id.
14 126 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Magis. Ct., Queens Co. 1953).
15 Id.
16 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 435-16.0(d)(1). The
statute provides in pertinent part:
Advertising.-I. It shall be unlawful for any person to use,
suffer or permit to be used advertising in the form of towing
banners from or upon an aircraft over the limits of the city, or
to drop advertising matter in the form of pamphlets, circulars,
or other objects from an aircraft over the limits of the city, or
to use a loud speaker or other sound device for advertising
from an aircraft over the limits of the city. Any person who
employs another to avigate an aircraft for advertising in
violation of this subdivision shall be guilty of a violation
hereof.
Id. See also, NEW YORK CITY ADMINSTRATIVE CODE § 10- 126(d)(1) (1985).
[Vol 16
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In that case, Coffrin's plane took-off from Key Port in New
Jersey, and proceeded over the Atlantic Ocean to a point one-half
mile off-shore, giving rise to the dispositive question of whether
that particular place is "over the limits of the city."' 7 Coffrin
argued that the towing was not in fact done "over the limits" of
New York City as required by the ordinance." Coffrin
additionally challenged the constitutionality of the 1953 Code
provision.
The Magistrates' Court analyzed Coffrin's initial contention by
first consulting the 1953 Code which specifically set out the
geographic limits of New York City with respect to Queens
County.'9 The court found it to be clear from this reference that the
17 Id. at331.
18 Id.
19 ADMISTRATfvE CODE OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK § 2-1.0(4). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
[W]hence southerly on a line parallel to the westerly line of
Beach Second street and distant 100 feet westerly therefrom to
the northerly side of Seagirt avenue; thence easterly along the
northerly side of Seagirt avenue until it intersects the former
village boundary at Bannister creek; thence south 10
<<degrees>> 21'10"' east, a distance of 291.20 feet; thence
south 4 << degrees>> 51'30"' east, a distance of 780 feet to
approximately the center line of Far Rockaway bay or inlet as
it existed the fifth day of April, nineteen hundred twenty-
eight; thence westerly along this approximate center line of
Far Rockaway bay or inlet to the Atlantic ocean the following
courses and distances: South 85 <<degrees>> 22'25.' west, a
distance of 1805.50 feet to the easterly boundary of Beach
Ninth street (Jarvis lane) prolonged southerly in a straight line;
thence south 84 <<degrees>> 44'44"' west, a distance of
504.52 feet; thence south 61 <<degrees>> 35'04"' west, a
distance of 1106.22 feet; thence south 68 <<degrees>>
45'10"' west, a distance of 1150.00 feet; thence south 18
<<degrees>> 45'10"' west, a distance of 500 feet;
thencebounded on the south by the southerly boundary of the
state, beginning at a point where the easterly boundary of the
borough and county or prolongation thereof intersects such
southerly boundary of the state; thence westerly along such
line to a point where it intersects the boundary of the borough
of Brooklyn and county of Kings or prolongation thereof.
2000
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city limit extended only to the portion of the Atlantic Ocean which
is at low-water mark.20 The court next addressed the boundaries of
Queens County, concluding that it was bound to the south by the
Atlantic Ocean.2 ' The People, in an effort to sustain their
allegation that the violation occurred within the "limits of the city,"
cited two New York cases in which jurisdiction of the New York
City courts were extended beyond the limits of the city.'
However, the Magistrates' Court distinguished these cases from
Coffrin, finding that those cases' respective laws expressly
provided for a territorial extension, thus explicitly conferring the
authority by which the courts could extend the bounds of their
jurisdiction.23 The Magistrates' Court pointed out that no such
territorial extension was provided for in the 1953 Code.
Additionally, the court found that Section 1 I(A) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which provided for an extension of courts'
jurisdiction two nautical miles into the Atlantic Ocean was
inapplicable, stating that in order for this provision to be invoked,
there must be an invasion or breaking of the law within the
Id. See Coffrin, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (analyzing the limits of New York City
with respect to Queens County because Queens is the county over which
defendant was charged with the violation).
20 Id.
21 Id. The court consulted the Consolidated Notes of State Law, McKinney's
Consolidated Laws of New York in determining Queens County's boundaries.
The Notes state in pertinent part:
The County of Queens shall contain all that part of this state,
bounded easterly, by Suffolk county; southerly, by the
Atlantic ocean; northerly, by the Long Island Sound; and
westerly, by the west bounds of the townships of Newtown
and Jamaica; including Lloyd's Neck, or Queens village, and
the islands called the Two Brothers, and Hallet's Island, and
all the islands in the sound opposite to the said bounds, and
southward of the main channel.
Id.
' People v. Reilly, 14 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (Magis. Ct., Kings Co. 1939) (finding
that defendant, inter alia, navigated a boat within one thousand feet of a bathing
beach and advertised by sign on the boat) and People v. Harrow, 191 Misc. 216,
76 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Magis. Ct., Queens Co. 1948) (charging defendant with
unlawfully towing a pilotless balloon from a motor boat for purposes of
advertising within 1,000 feet of a beach).
2 Coffrin, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
[Vol 16
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Atlantic.24 The Magistrates' Court found that the action is only a
violation if it occurs "over the city limits," therefore no law was
violated over the Atlantic Ocean.2' Thus, the court held that the
alleged violation did not take place "over the limits of the city" as
required by the1953 Code, therefore the court lacked jurisdiction
over the constitutional issue.
Although the Magistrates' Court in Coffrin dismissed the case
due to lack of jurisdiction, the court still addressed the
constitutionality of the 1953 Code provision. Evidently, the Coffrin
court determined the fate of the statute in 1953. However, the
Coffrin court did not have jurisdiction to enforce its determination,
so it required another alleged violation of the provision to invoke
the Coffrin court's determination.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute, the Magistrates'
Court applied the rule of preemption set out in Quaker Oats Co. v.
City of New York.2 6 In Quaker Oats, a New York City statute
governing and regulating the sale of horse meat intended for
animal feed, required companies engaged in the preparation of
horse meat which was to be sold in New York City to
decharacterize the product in an effort to prevent the distribution of
animal food as human food.27  The applicable federal statute
24 Id. The court makes reference to CRIM. PROC. CODE § I I-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which states in pertinent part: "Wherever the territorial
limit of jurisdiction of any of the courts specified in section eleven of this
chapter is the Atlantic ocean, the criminal jurisdiction of such court shall extend
into the Atlantic ocean to a line two nautical miles distant from the short at high
water mark." Id.
25id.
26 295 N.Y. 527, 534, 68 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1946). The court stated the rule of
preemption as follows:
Equally settled is the rule that, even if the Federal government
has legislated in a particular field, local regulation in that field
is not necessarily prohibited unless national uniformity is
essential. The State or municipal statute will be stricken only
if in terms or in practical administration it conflicts with the
Federal law or infringes on its policy.
Id
27 Id. at 533, 68 N.E.2d at 594. The statute states in pertinent part:
Horseflesh, whether alone or combined with other ingredients,
intended for animal feed shall not be brought into the City of
New York, transported, or held, kept, stored, or offered for
2000 655
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mandates that such products distributed in hermetically sealed
containers are only required to affix labeling on the containers
identifying the nature of the product, while products that are not
packaged in these containers must be decharacterized by means
such as artificial coloring.2" Quaker Oats packaged its product in
hermetically sealed contaiiiers affixed with labels proclaiming that
the product was made with horsemeat.29 Since the local law
required Quaker Oats to decharacterize its product while the
federal laW simply required appropriate labeling, the court held
that the local law was preempted because it was in direct conflict
with the federal law.3"
Regarding the case at bar, the Criminal Court adopted verbatim
the dicta of the Coffrin court pertaining to the issue of
constitutionality with regard to the 1999 Code. In Coffrin, the
magistrates' court acknowledged that state law allows aircrafts to
tow banners provided that they obtain permission to do so from the
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.3 The court found that the
sale or sold unless decharacterized by harmless coloring or
otherwise in a manner and with materials satisfactory to the
Department of Health.
Id.
2 Id. at 536, 68 N.E.2d at 596-7. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Dog food or other animal food prepared in whole or in part,
from materials derived from cattle, sheep, swine, goats, or
horses, shall be distinguished from articles of human food, so
as to avoid the distribution of such animal food as human
food. To accomplish this, labeling of hermetically sealed,
conventional retail size containers as, for example, 'dog food'
will be considered sufficient. If not in such containers, the
product must not only be properly identified, but it must be of
such character or so treated (denatured or decharacterized) as
to be readily distinguishable from an article of human food.
Dog food shall not be represented as being a human food.'
(Emphasis supplied.)
Id.
29 Id. at 533, 68 N.E.2d at 595.
30 Id. at 537, 68 N.E.2d at 597.
31 Coffrin, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 334. This case make reference to the N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 245(12). This statute provides in pertinent part: "No pilot shall tow
anything by aircraft unless authority for such operation has been issued by the
administrator of civil aeronautics." Id.
656 [Vol 16
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local ordinance did not provide a provision allowing a person
seeking to tow a banner the opportunity to obtain permission."
The court even posed an amendment to the statute, which would
allow the statute to pass constitutional muster.33 Since a provision
of this nature is absent, the court held that "the City, by local
ordinance has completely prohibited that which the state and
Federal authorities permit."' The court went on to explain the
potential ramifications if this statute 'were found to be
constitutional.3
After adopting the Coffrin court's determination that the statute
was preempted by federal law, the Santoriello court analyzed the
Federal government's authority to preempt local law in the area of
aviation. The court turned first to Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. i.
Town of Gardiner6 which seemed to establish local control over
the area of aviation. In Blue Sky, the town attempted to defend the
constitutionality of a town law which sought to regulate many
facets of small airports and parachute jumping centers." In
attempting to sustain the constitutionality of the town law, the
town relied on a New Jersey Superior Court decision in Parachutes
32 Id.
31 Id. at 335. The court stated:
If the local ordinance provided for safeguards before issuing
permission for airplane banner towing over the limits of the
City of New York by reason of the congested nature of this
great metropolitan area, or for other cogent reasons, it would
not then be in conflict with either the State statutes or Federal
regulations, but would be in consonance therewith.
Id.
3Id.
s Id. The court states that:
If this ordinance is constitutional, there is nothing to stop
every hamlet, town, village and municipality in the state from
passing a similar ordinance, thereby prohibiting throughout
the state that which the state itself and the Federal government
expressly permit. By a parity, and extension of reasoning, the
same kind of an ordinance could be locally enacted throughout
the entire United States.
Id.
' 711 F.Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
37 Id. at 681.
6572000
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Inc. v. Township of Lakewood"8 in which plaintiff sought to
invalidate the Township's noise ordinance.39 The Superior Court
upheld the constitutionality of the local ordinance, holding that a
municipality "may regulate noise from airplanes hovering or
cruising at low lvels -for -sport -parachuting."' However, the
Santoriello court found a United States Supreme Court decision,
decided subsequent to Parachute Inc., to be controlling.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking
off between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. was invalid because
Congress, by its enactment of the Federal Aviation Act and Noise
Control Act, preempted state and local control over aircraft noise.4'
In support of their holding, the Santoriello court cited the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2).43 The Santoriello court
went on to distinguish the present case from Blue Sky, holding that
Santoriello's action did not constitute a nuisance as is evoked by
Blue Sky.'
The Santoriello court further discussed a Second Circuit case,
decided prior to City of Burbank, which established local authority
to invoke noise ordinances in extreme circumstances. 45  In
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, plaintiffs sued to
enjoin the enforcement against them of the Town of Hempstead's
noise ordinance.' The court, relying on credible evidence that the
aircraft noise negatively affected the community in nearly every
38 296 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. 1972).
39 Id.
40 Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43.
41 493 U.S. 624 (1973).
42 Id. at 625-26.
43 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(b)(2) (1994). This statute states in pertinent part: "The
Administrator [of the FAA] shall prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight of
aircraft for (A) navigating, protecting and identifying aircraft and (B) protecting
individuals and property on the ground." Id.
" Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
45 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
46 Id. at 370. The Town Unnecessary Noise Ordinance "forbid[s] anyone from
operating a mechanism or device (including airplanes) which creates a noise
within the Town exceeding either of two 'limiting noise spectra.'" Id.
658 [Vol 16
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aspect of community life," held that the noise ordinance regulation
is necessary in some cases, and found Hempstead to be one of
those cases.4
After analyzing the applicable case law, the Santoriello court
concluded that aircraft regulation is governed by the federal arm of
the government.49 In support of this holding, the court cites
various provisions of the Federal Aviation Act which essentially
establish that the Federal government has exclusive sovereignty of
United States airspace and that the Administrator of the FAA has
broad authority to regulate in this area."0
Despite noting that a par-sail is not by definition an aircraft as
interpreted by the FAA, the Criminal Court concluded that
Santoriello's receipt of a "Certificate of Waiver or Authorization"
to operate his par-sail was in direct conflict with the local
ordinance." Since the local ordinance entirely prohibits that which
4' Id. The court set out its findings concerning aircraft noise in the Town of
Hempstead as follows:
There is credible evidence that the noise of an aircraft
overflight in Hempstead is frequently intense enough to
interrupt sleep, conversation and the conduct of religious
services, and to submerge for the duration of the maximum
noise part of the overflight the sound of radio, phonograph and
television. There is credible evidence that the noise of an
aircraft overflight in Hempstead is frequently intense enough
to interrupt classroom activities in schools and to be a source
of discomfort to the ill and distraction to the well. It is a fair
inference from the affidavits, the demonstration (in the
courtroom) of the sound levels recorded in the Town and the
evidence of frequency of overflights that airplane noise is a
factor of moment affecting the decisions of people to acquire
or dispose of interests in real property in the areas within the
Town affected by the sound of airplane overflights.
Id.
4' Id. at 376.
41 Satoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
50 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(2) (1994). This statute states in pertinent part: "a
citizen of the United States ... has a public right of transit through the navigable
airspace." Id. See supra notes 5 and 8 and accompanying text.
51 Santoriello, 702 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
2000 659
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